Hey, NFL, Burn the Draft Cards
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by user DNL
Of all of America's major sports leagues, the NFL has the most viable claim to parity. While there are perenially good teams like the Patriots and Eagles, it seems that each team (well, almost/sometimes/maybe) makes the playoffs a few times a decade.
The NFL is also uniquely proud of its parity -- a biproduct of a weak player's union, a short season where every upset it highly significant, and of course, a deep playoff system. So it's shocking that every year, toward the end of April, the NFL takes it's "rah rah parity!" foam finger and shreds it.
How? Witness the NFL Draft.
A few years ago, some football fans who just happen to be PhDs in Economics decided to figure out which draft pick, given the salary that the team ends up paying for the player they draft, is worth the most. Think of it as a cost-benefit analysis. The answer: pick #40-something was the "best" one to have. Not #1. #43 or so.
The reasons? Let's count:
- The first pick overall is going to command a HUGE salary -- and he's never done anything in the NFL. He could be the next Peyton Manning, yes, but he could be the next Courtney Brown.
- The team that takes the first pick overall typically isn't very good, and needs a lot more than just one B+ or better player.
The net result: A team that needs a lot of good players instead gets bogged down with a salary cap hit that makes it near impossible to reach that goal.
The conclusion: Get rid of the draft.
Let's start with some junk science -- because it's fun, and honestly, not all that junky.
This One Goes to Eleven!
Earlier this week, I saw the following comparison. Forgot where, though.
The author compared the 1st overall pick to the 11th, and asked, which team did better? I think it's an interesting comparison, even if it does reek of selection bias:
| Year | 1st Pick | 11th Pick |
|---|---|---|
| 2006 | Mario Williams | Jay Cutler |
| 2005 | Alex Smith | Shawne Merriman |
| 2004 | Eli Manning | Ben Roethlisberger |
| 2003 | Carson Palmer | Marcus Trufant |
| 2002 | David Carr | Dwight Freeney |
| 2001 | Michael Vick | Dan Morgan |
| 2000 | Courtney Brown | Ron Dayne |
| 1999 | Tim Couch | Daunte Culpepper |
Call it a toss-up, especially if you go with, oh, #9 or #15 instead of #11. But a toss-up suggests that the value of the #1 pick isn't really worth the price. And besides, a lot of times the real value has nothing to do with the players, but instead with the team who is doing the drafting.
Let's look at 1999 again. Couch v. Culpepper. I realize that I'm cherrypicking, but hey, it leads into my next point so well.
A Good Player on a Good Team >>> A Very Good Player on a Bad Team
I'm republishing here something I wrote a few years back, in Pro Football Prospectus:
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In 1999, the Cleveland Browns (2.0) restarted their history and selected Tim Couch with the first overall pick. Daunte Culpepper was taken ten picks later by the Minnesota Vikings. Both were perceived to be quality players. Sooner or later, both were going to have the opportunity they needed to become stars.
Six years later, Couch is, for all intents and purposes, out of the NFL. Culpepper is the second best fantasy quarterback in the league, and that is only because of some guy named Peyton. What gives? It’s not talent. There is simply no way that talent and talent alone makes up for such a stark difference. It is that Culpepper entered a fantastic environment and Couch, not so much. |
That still hold true today. The NFL draft perverts the salary cap system by letting good teams get good players, but sends the very good into football purgatory. Guys like Couch are rushed into the spotlight and asked to produce right away; guys like Culpepper are put into a team where both he and his 'mates can thrive.
Ask yourself this: Would any team over the last five, or even ten years, with the #1 pick overall, be better off with (a) the best player in the draft or (b) three "good-plus" rookies? The Couch/Culpepper dichotomy suggests the latter. As does San Diego Chargers history.
A Tale of Two (and only two) Trades
In 2001, the Chargers traded out of the #1 spot, giving up Michael Vick. In return, they got the Atlanta Falcons' #1 (fifth overall) and #3 in 2001, their #2 in 2002, and Tim Dwight. The Chargers still had the first pick in round 2 in 2001, and retained their top 2 picks in 2002. Over this two year period, the Chargers were able to totally retool, grabbing not just Dwight, but LaDanian Tomlinson, Drew Brees, Reche Caldwell, Quentin Jammer, and Toniu Fonoti.
The Chargers repeated the magic a few years later, trading the #1 overall pick, Eli Manning, for (effectively) Phillip Rivers, Shawne Merriman, and Nate Kaeding. In 2005, Manning's salary was just over $9.3 million. Rivers, Merriman, and Kaeding came in under $9 million, combined.
Oh, and they had the best record in the NFL this year, going into the playoffs. Hmm.
Meanwhile, in 2005, the San Francisco 49ers were in a much different position. There was no Vick, no Eli -- that is, no clear #1. Leading up to the draft, the draft-following world was amock, having a really hard time figuring out whether Alex Smith or Aaron Rodgers would be the better pick. It could have gone either way, and one has to believe that the Niners knew that -- and were hoping to trade down, grabbing whichever wasn't taken. Indeed, with two good options at QB, three stud RBs, and with few teams near the top looking for quarterbacks, it was a near-lock that San Fran could go as low as 5 and still get one of the two guys they wanted.
But no trade was to be found.
A ridiculous outcome, because let's face it, a really high pick isn't worth as much as people claim. Why? Point four:
The Price is Wrong
Alex Smith is no Eli Manning. That's probably unfair to Smith, and too generous to Peyton's little brother, but at the end of the day, but it's "common knowledge" -- to everyone except Smith.
Smith was the #1 pick overall. Manning was the #1 pick overall the year before. The NFL is growing, as is its cap space.
So, naturally, Smith concluded, he should be paid as much as Eli. No, wait, more than Manning. Just the same percentage of the pie.
But no rational team would pay that much for Alex Smith. That's demonstrably true. The Giants traded a bounty of picks for Eli; the Niners couldn't find a buyer for Smith. Given that the demand for Smith was much, much lower than that for Eli, shouldn't Smith be paid less?
In fact, that's exactly what I'm proposing.
Burn the Draft Cards -- And Institute a Tiered Salary Cap Earmark
I'm not sure about the numbers -- you'd need a "capologlist" for that, and there are some details (below) which need ironing out. But here's the gist.
- Require that each team assign $1.4m of its cap space to rookies.
- Give each team an extra -- that is, above and beyond the cap -- $100k for every team better than them the previous year. So the Raiders get $3.1m more in cap room.
- However, earmark that $3.1 so that it can only be used on rookies.
There are some problems, such as the dollar amount, whether you'd be able to float unused money to the next year, and whether you could trade this bonus cap space. But those are details -- the core is its own idea.
So...
With the #1 pick in the NFL Draft, the Oakland Raiders select (choose one):
- JaMarcus Russell, a feast-or-famine project who runs the risk of being a Ryan Leaf/Akili Smith-style salary albatross;
- Brady Quinn, a safer pick, but will he make you a contender?;
- Calvin Johnson, the best talent in the draft, but no WR is worth $9 million a year, unless he's Jerry Rice and 20 years younger
- Joe Thomas, to be paired with *cough* Robert Gallery
None of those guys are going to make the Silver and Black into Gold.
But whomever's name is called... he'll be running a mint full of the stuff.
On the other hand, imagine if the Raiders were given an extra, oh, $5 million ($100k per team better than them, plus the standard $1.4m "rookie cap" I'm proposing) in "rookie cap" space. They pick up a QB of the future in Kevin Kolb, grab a guard like Justin Blaylock, and use an extra $1m of regular cap space to look at Joe Staley.
Meanwhile, the QB-desperate Baltimore Ravens break the bank, and use their $1.7m in rookie space and another $7m in regular cap space to give Brady Quinn a wheelbarrow of cash, and, as a consolation prize, the Chicago Bears do the same for JaMarcus Russell.
The Raiders rebuild. The contenders repatch. Doesn't that make a lot more sense?
Basketball has the right idea with "slotting" of salaries, and baseball has adopted something similar recently, with mixed results. The bottom line is its buyer beware.
Someone who makes 20 grand can't afford a Mercedes, so why shop for one? If you go to Denny's and the menu says prime rib, well, you get what you deserve.
The only guy in the draft who is considered a future franchise type player is Johnson. Most guys will end up getting cut in camp, so why bother drafting someone who can't help you just because Mel Kiper Jr. ranks him top ten?